Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors
Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.01.003
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发表时间：
2010-07
影响因子：
8.9
通讯作者：
Ruediger Fahlenbrach;A. Low;René M. Stulz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ruediger Fahlenbrach;A. Low;René M. Stulz
公司积极寻求任命外部首席执行官进入董事会。与我们的外部CEO董事会任命的匹配理论一致，我们表明这种任命对任命公司有认证好处。首席执行官更有可能加入地理位置相近、奉行类似的财务和投资政策、治理水平与自己的公司相当的大型老牌公司的董事会。第一次任命外部CEO董事比任命另一名外部董事有更高的股价反应。除连锁董事任命后经营业绩下降外，CEO董事不影响被任命公司的经营业绩、决策和CEO薪酬。
Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit for the appointing firm. CEOs are more likely to join boards of large established firms that are geographically close, pursue similar financial and investment policies, and have comparable governance to their own firms. The first outside CEO director appointment has a higher stock-price reaction than the appointment of another outside director. Except for a decrease in operating performance following the appointment of an interlocked director, CEO directors do not affect the appointing firm's operating performance, decision-making, and CEO compensation.