Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: Conflict or harmony of interest?
Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: Conflict or harmony of interest?
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不同公共物品偏好的税收协调：利益冲突还是和谐？
DOI：
10.1007/bf00400144
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Andreas Haufler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Andreas Haufler
本文分析了高税收国家的消费者进口和生产者出口的单一私人商品贸易模型中的战略商品税。给出了纳什均衡存在的条件，并通过对公共产品的不同偏好引入了不对称。本文讨论了两种税收协调措施——最低税率和协调提高跨境购物成本。研究表明，税收协调通常有利于高税收国家，而低税收国家只有在初始均衡时税收竞争强度较高或政府对公共产品供给的有效边际成本具有价格敏感性时才会受益。
The paper analyzes strategic commodity taxation in a model with trade in a single private good that is simultaneously imported by consumers of a high-tax country and exported by its producers. Conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given, and an asymmetry is introduced through different preferences for public goods. Two tax coordination measures are discussed—a minimum tax rate and a coordinated increase in the costs of cross-border shopping. It is shown that tax coordination generally benefits the high-tax country while the low-tax country will gain only if the intensity of tax competition is high in the initial equilibrium or if governments are pricesensitive toward the effective marginal costs of public good supply.
影响因子：
1.3
作者：
Furuzawa;A.;H.;Kunieda;et al.;宮本太郎;宮崎真素美;Shigeyuki Kondo;Makoto Yano and Takakazu Honryo
通讯作者：
Makoto Yano and Takakazu Honryo