Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off
Financial Incentives and the Fertility-Sex Ratio Trade-Off
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DOI：
10.1257/app.20150234
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发表时间：
2018-04-01
影响因子：
6.2
通讯作者：
Anukriti, S.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Anukriti, S.
财政激励措施能否解决那些持续偏爱男孩和容易获得性别选择技术的国家面临的生育率和性别比权衡问题？印度的一个名为Devi Rupak的项目试图降低生育率，但性别比无法做到这一点。尽管生育率下降，但出生时的性别比恶化，因为高男孩偏好的家庭不愿放弃男孩，尽管女儿的福利要高得多。因此，经济激励在解决生育-性别比冲突方面可能只起到有限的作用。
Can financial incentives resolve the fertility-sex ratio trade-off faced by countries with persistent son preference and easy access to sex-selection technology? An Indian program, Devi Rupak, that seeks to lower fertility and the sex ratio is unable to do so. Although fertility decreases, the sex ratio at birth worsens as high son preference families are unwilling to forgo a son despite substantially higher benefits for a daughter Thus, financial incentives may only play a limited role in the resolution of the ility-sex ratio conflict.