How could consciousness emerge from adaptive functioning
How could consciousness emerge from adaptive functioning
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意识如何从适应性功能中产生
DOI：
10.51291/2377-7478.1160
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Velmans
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文献类型：
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作者：
M. Velmans
雷伯认为，具有柔性细胞壁和运动性的生物（而不是非柔性细胞壁且没有运动性）突然出现的意识涉及进化的不连续性。所有“不连续”意识理论都需要这种“奇迹”。为了避免奇迹般的出现，人们可能需要考虑连续性理论，该理论接受不同形式的意识和物质功能共同进化，但假设意识的存在是原始的，就像物理学中物质和能量被假设为原始一样。马克斯·维尔曼斯 (Max Velmans)，金史密斯学院荣誉退休心理学教授，拥有 100 多篇关于意识的出版物，包括《理解意识》(2000 年、2009 年)、《深入理解意识》(2017 年) 以及联合编辑的《布莱克威尔意识伴侣》(2000 年、2017 年)。 http://www.gold.ac.uk/psychology/staff/velmans/ 人们应该在哪里划清有意识的实体和无意识的实体之间的界限？在我对这个问题的各种研究调查中（Velmans，2000，第12章；2007；2009，第14章；2011，2012），我得出的结论是，关于意识分布的理论分为连续性理论和不连续性理论。连续性理论家认为，在从宏观物质下降到微观物质的过程中，意识突然从无到有出现，不存在任意的路线。相反，物质的基本形式可能与经验的基本形式相关联。如果它们编码信息，它们可能与基本的思维形式相关联。不连续性理论都声称意识是在宇宙演化的特定时刻出现的。他们只是在哪一点上存在分歧。因此，不连续性理论都面临着同样的问题。是什么把灯打开了？物质在进化的某个特定阶段，突然赋予了意识，是什么？几乎所有人都试图用功能术语来定义过渡点，尽管他们对关键功能的性质存在不同意见。有些人认为意识只有在人类身上才会“开启”，例如，一旦他们获得了语言或心智理论。一些人认为，一旦大脑达到临界尺寸或复杂性，意识就会出现。其他人则认为它与学习、移动或以其他适应性方式对环境做出反应的能力共同出现。鉴于意识在人类中毫无疑问的存在以及它可能存在于许多其他动物中，Reber（2016）在有机生命的早期形式中寻找意识的起源并将意识的进化与这些有机体的进化联系起来是完全合理的。正如他在动物感知的细胞基础 2016.138：Velmans on Reber on Mind 2 Consciousness (CBC) 论文所依据的 Axiom 中所断言：“心智和意识不是人类大脑的独特特征。它们以几乎每个物种中以更简单的形式存在的固有特征为基础。任何具有灵活细胞壁、对周围环境敏感和运动能力的生物体都将拥有心智和意识的生物学基础” （第 4 页）。请注意，尽管雷伯对意识分布的分析比大多数分析更具包容性，但它仍然是一种不连续性理论，它将拥有某种形式意识的生物体与不具有某种形式意识的生物体区分开来，在对环境做出反应并具有运动能力的单细胞和不具有运动能力的单细胞之间划定了界限。例如，他排除了“植物和真菌，因为它们具有由纤维素、半纤维素和果胶（植物）或几丁质（真菌）组成的刚性细胞壁，并且缺乏内源运动的能力”（第 4 页，注 4）。当然，我们可以指出一些植物对环境有反应并且具有移动的能力。例如，含羞草植物的小叶习惯于重复刺激——即，小叶在第一次触摸时迅速关闭——但在重复刺激后，它们会完全重新打开，并且在刺激保持不变时不会再次关闭。令人惊讶的是，这种习惯是特定于刺激的。例如，Holmes & Yost (1966) 使用水滴或画笔笔划诱导小叶闭合，并且在重复刺激（使用任一刺激）后发生习惯化。但如果刺激发生变化（从水滴到笔触，或反之亦然），传单闭合就会再次发生（另请参阅 Applewhite，1975 年的综述）。无论人们是否希望包括某些植物，这些划分标准仍然是一个谜：为什么拥有灵活的细胞壁和内源运动性可以在“像某物成为某物”和“什么都不是”之间提供清晰的区分？例如，原则上，它可能就像具有不灵活的细胞壁和很少运动的东西。或者换个角度来表达这个谜团，拥有灵活的细胞壁或突然开启意识的内源性运动是什么？雷伯承认了这个问题。在他对关于基于大脑的意识的许多理论的批评中，他指出：“......都存在一个致命的缺陷：它们需要奇迹。它们都需要指定产生意识状态的复杂神经状态的属性；它们必须识别允许大脑形成思想的神经或计算属性。更糟糕的是，它们需要解释为什么当神经系统跨越某个复杂性阈值或碰到正确的一组互连神经中心和通路时，它会突然“产生意识”......诚然，CBC 也呼吁出现奇迹，但这是一个非常小的奇迹，而且比当前神经科学家和心灵哲学家为我们提出的奇迹要容易处理得多。” （第 7 页）但是在小细胞中发生的奇迹仍然是奇迹！在我看来，雷伯关于这些比大大脑中的奇迹更容易处理的断言，以及他随后的论点，混淆了意识（任何种类）存在的条件与确定它可以采取的多种形式所需的附加条件（Velmans，2012）。为什么雷伯关于细胞意识的“小奇迹”以及他随后对其《动物感知》2016.138：Velmans on Reber on Origins of Mind 3进化的分析似乎使人类意识的存在变得更容易处理？因为一旦人们假设意识（在单个细胞中）的存在——以及不同形式的心理功能和伴随它们的现象意识形式之间尚未被发现但完全合理的关系——我们就可以对适应性心理功能及其伴随的体验如何共同进化给出一个完整的功能性解释（Velmans，2012）。谁能怀疑言语思想需要语言，或者完整的人类自我意识需要心灵理论？如果没有世界的内部表征，意识怎么可能是任何东西呢？如果没有动力和接近或回避的能力，那么基本的快乐或痛苦还有什么意义呢？然而，这些理论都没有解释这种突然开启意识的生物功能是什么（Velmans，2011）关于这些基本问题以及如何解决这些问题还有很多话要说。 《动物感知》中的评论长度限制不允许在这里详细阐述。可以在此处找到该评论的更完整版本，其中对 Reber 的 CBC 理论进行了更详细的分析，并提供了替代的连续性方法。
The sudden appearance of consciousness that Reber posits in creatures with flexible cell walls and motility rather than non-flexible cells walls and no motility involves an evolutionary discontinuity. This kind of “miracle” is required by all “discontinuity” theories of consciousness. To avoid miraculous emergence, one may need to consider continuity theories, which accept that different forms of consciousness and material functioning coevolve but assume the existence of consciousness to be primal in the way that matter and energy are assumed to be primal in physics. Max Velmans, Professor of Psychology, Emeritus, Goldsmiths, has over 100 publications on consciousness, including Understanding Consciousness (2000, 2009), Towards a Deeper Understanding of Consciousness (2017), and the jointly edited Blackwell Companion to Consciousness (2000, 2017). http://www.gold.ac.uk/psychology/staff/velmans/ Where should one draw the line between entities that are conscious and those that are not? In my various surveys of research on this question (Velmans, 2000, ch. 12; 2007; 2009, ch. 14; 2011, 2012), I conclude that theories about the distribution of consciousness divide into continuity and discontinuity theories. Continuity theorists suggest that there is no arbitrary line in the descent from macroscopic to microscopic matter at which consciousness suddenly appears out of nothing. Rather, elementary forms of matter may be associated with elementary forms of experience. And if they encode information, they may be associated with rudimentary forms of mind. Discontinuity theories all claim that consciousness emerged at a particular point in the evolution of the universe. They merely disagree about which point. Consequently, discontinuity theories all face the same problem. What switched the lights on? What is it about matter, at a particular stage of evolution, that suddenly gave it consciousness? Nearly all try to define the point of transition in functional terms, although they disagree about the nature of the critical function. Some think consciousness “switched on” only in humans, for example, once they acquired language or a theory of mind. Some believe that consciousness emerged once brains reached a critical size or complexity. Others believe it co-emerged with the ability to learn, to move, or to respond in some other adaptive way to the environment. Given the unquestionable presence of consciousness in humans and its likely presence in many other animals, it is entirely reasonable for Reber (2016) to search for the origins of consciousness in early forms of organic life and to link the evolution of consciousness to the evolution of those organisms. As he asserts in the Axiom on which his Cellular Basis of Animal Sentience 2016.138: Velmans on Reber on Origins of Mind 2 Consciousness (CBC) thesis depends: “Mind and consciousness are not unique features of human brains. They are grounded in inherent features present in simpler forms in virtually every species. Any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness” (p. 4). Note that although Reber’s analysis of the distribution of consciousness is far more inclusive than most, it is still a discontinuity theory that separates organisms that possess a form of consciousness from those that don’t, placing the boundary between single cells that are responsive to their environment and have a capacity for locomotion and those that don’t. For example, he excludes “plants and fungi on the grounds that they have rigid cell walls composed of cellulose, hemicellulose and pectin (plants) or chitin (fungi), and lack the capacity for endogenous locomotion” (p. 4, note 4). One could of course point out that some plants are responsive to their environment and have the ability to move. For example, the leaflets of the Mimosa plant habituate to repeated stimulation — i.e., the leaflets rapidly close when first touched — but after repeated stimulation they re-open fully and do not close again while the stimulus remains the same. Surprisingly, this habituation is stimulus-specific. For example, Holmes & Yost (1966) induced leaflet closure using either water droplets or brush strokes, and after repeated stimulation (with either stimulus) habituation occurred. But if the stimulus was changed (from water drops to brush strokes or vice-versa), leaflet closure re-occurred (see also Applewhite, 1975, for a review). Whether or not one might wish to include some plants, these demarcation criteria still present a mystery: why should having flexible cell walls and endogenous motility provide a clear separation between it being “like something to be something” and being like nothing at all? In principle, for example, it might be like something to have inflexible cell walls and little movement. Or to express the mystery the other way around, what is it about having flexible cell walls or endogenous motility that suddenly switches on consciousness? Reber admits to the problem. In his critique of the many theories that about brain-based consciousness he points out that they: “... all suffer a fatal flaw: they require a miracle. They all need to specify the properties of complex neural states that give rise to conscious states; they have to identify the neural or computational properties that permit a brain to make a mind. And worse, they need to explicate why, when a neurological system crosses some threshold of complexity or hits upon the right set of interconnecting neural centers and pathways, it suddenly ‘makes consciousness.’ ... Admittedly, the CBC also calls for a miracle, but it's a very small one and far more tractable than the ones that current neuroscientists and philosophers of mind have put on the table for us.” (p. 7) But miracles that take place in little cells are still miracles! In my view, Reber’s assertion that these are far more tractable than miracles in big brains, along with his subsequent argument, confound the conditions for the existence of consciousness (of any kind) with the added conditions required to determine the many forms it can take (Velmans, 2012). Why does Reber’s “small miracle” of cellular consciousness and his subsequent analysis of its Animal Sentience 2016.138: Velmans on Reber on Origins of Mind 3 evolution seem to make the existence of human consciousness more tractable? Because once one assumes the existence of consciousness (in a single cell) — together with an as yet undiscovered but entirely plausible relationship between different forms of mental functioning and the forms of phenomenal consciousness that accompany them — one can give an entirely functional account of how adaptive mental functions and their accompanying experiences co-evolve (Velmans, 2012). Who can doubt that verbal thoughts require language, or that full human self-consciousness requires a theory of mind? Without internal representations of the world, how could consciousness be of anything? And without motility and the ability to approach or avoid, what point would there be to rudimentary pleasure or pain? However, none of these theories explains what it is about such biological functions that suddenly switches on consciousness (Velmans, 2011) There is much more to be said about these fundamental problems and how one might resolve them. Commentary length restrictions in Animal Sentience do not allow elaborating them here. A fuller version of this commentary, with a more elaborate analysis of Reber’s CBC theory along with an alternative, continuity approach can be found here.