The choice of cooperation mode in the bioenergy supply chain with random biomass feedstock yield
The choice of cooperation mode in the bioenergy supply chain with random biomass feedstock yield
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生物质原料产量随机的生物能源供应链合作模式选择
DOI：
10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.127587
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Ting Cui
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zigong Cai;Fei Ye;Zefei Xie;Li Zhang;Ting Cui
一个成功的生物能源生产者和农民之间的合作模式可以有效地促进生物质原料的供应，在生物能源产业中发挥着重要的作用。在本研究中，我们考察了生物能源供应链中两种流行的合作模式，即承包农业（CF）和土地作为股份（LS）。本研究评估了每种合作模式对供应链参与者的种植面积、原料质量和利润的影响。在CF下，农民和生物能源生产商签订合同，生物能源生产商购买农民生产的所有原料。在这种情况下，农民将土地使用权转换为公司股份，因此生物能源生产商将与农民分享部分销售收入。首先，我们发现当生物能源市场规模足够大时，LS下的生物质原料最优种植规模大于CF下的生物质原料最优种植规模。如果市场规模较小，则LS下生物质原料的供应量取决于原料质量的边际值。其次，当生物能源市场足够大时，LS下的农民和生物能源生产者可以实现双赢，提高了生物能源供应链的可靠性。第三，我们将我们的模型扩展到政府对生物质原料实施补贴的情况。我们发现，当补贴足够高时，LS下的生物质原料量会更大。此外，政府补贴并不一定能提高所有供应链参与者的利润，过多的政府补贴可能会对生物能源供应链的可靠性产生不利影响。
A successful cooperation mode between bioenergy producers and farmers can effectively promote the supply of biomass feedstock, which plays an important role in the bioenergy industry. In this study, we examine two prevailing cooperation modes in bioenergy supply chain, namely contract farming (CF) and land as shares (LS). This study assesses how each cooperation mode influences the planting acreage, the feedstock quality and the profits of supply chain participants. Under CF, the farmer and the bioenergy producer sign a contract in which the bioenergy producer purchases all feedstock produced by the farmer. Under LS, the farmer converts their land use rights into company shares, so that the bioenergy producer will share part of sales revenue with the farmer. First, we find that the optimal planting scale of biomass feedstock under LS is larger than that under CF when the bioenergy market size is sufficiently large. If the market size is relatively small, the supply quantity of biomass feedstock under LS depends on the marginal value of feedstock quality. Second, when the bioenergy market is sufficiently large, the farmer and the bioenergy producer under LS can achieve a win-win situation, which improves the reliability of the bioenergy supply chain. Third, we extend our model to the case where the government implements subsidies for biomass feedstock. We find that when the subsidy is high enough, the biomass feedstock quantity under LS will be larger. In addition, government subsidy does not necessarily improve the profit of all supply chain participants and excessive government subsidy may adversely affect the reliability of the bioenergy supply chain.