The strength of weakness: pseudo-clubs in the climate regime
The strength of weakness: pseudo-clubs in the climate regime
复制标题
弱点的力量：气候制度中的伪俱乐部
DOI：
10.1007/s10584-015-1481-4
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
Jessica F. Green
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jessica F. Green
俱乐部的政治效用取决于它们为会员提供特殊利益的能力。但在某些情况下，气候俱乐部的成员资格并不容易划分，可排除的利益可能微乎其微。我认为这些治理计划——成员是流动的，收益很小——更准确地定义为“伪俱乐部”。尽管“伪俱乐部”的功能与传统俱乐部不同，但它们可能具有相当大的政治效用。它们可以通过解决与温室气体测量有关的技术问题，为减缓排放奠定基础。此外，由于它们的入门成本低，制裁最小，因此很容易吸引大量用户。有了广泛的成员，“伪俱乐部”可以帮助促进标准的吸收，潜在地解决协调问题。然而，由于计量只是减排的前奏，最终，计量的激励措施必须与减排规则相结合。对环境有效的伪俱乐部最终将需要政府的帮助，从协调排放测量转向合作减排。伪俱乐部可以作为有意义的气候行动的初步基石，但政府必须完成这项工作。
The political utility of clubs hinges on their ability to provide excludable benefits to members. But in some cases of climate clubs, membership is not easily demarcated, and excludable benefits may be minimal. I argue that these governance initiatives—where membership is fluid and benefits are small—are more accurately defined as “pseudo-clubs.” Though they function differently than conventional clubs, “pseudo-clubs” can have considerable political utility. They can lay the foundations for emissions mitigation by solving technical problems associated with the measurement of GHGs. Moreover, since they have low entry costs and minimal sanctions, they can easily attract large numbers of users. With broad membership “pseudo-clubs” can help promote the uptake of standards, potentially solving coordination problems. However, since measurement is only a precursor to reduction, ultimately, incentives to measure will have to be coupled with rules to reduce emissions. Environmentally effective pseudo-clubs will eventually need the help of governments to shift from coordinating emissionsmeasurementto cooperating on emissionsreduction. Pseudo-clubs can serve as an initial building block toward meaningful climate action, but governments will have to finish the job.