Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment
Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment
复制标题
具有一维承诺的二维意识形态空间的选举竞争
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-010-0460-y
复制
发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
J. Roy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Dziubiński;J. Roy
我们研究了具有两个正交问题的两个候选人之间的选举竞争模型，其中候选人有任职动机并致力于其中一个维度上的特定职位，同时有(可信地)选择另一个维度上的任何职位的自由。我们分析了两种设置：一种是两个候选人都致力于同一维度，另一种是每个候选人致力于不同的维度。当核心为空时，我们主要研究纯策略纳什均衡的刻画和存在性。我们证明了，如果选民理想政策的分布是连续可微的，并且有一个有限的支持，那么如果候选人有足够的差异化，那么均衡是存在的。对于候选人有共同承诺问题的情况，我们的结果对价态文献有影响。
We study a model of electoral competition between two candidates with two orthogonal issues, where candidates are office motivated and committed to a particular position in one of the dimensions, while having the freedom to select (credibly) any position on the other dimension. We analyse two settings: one where both candidates are committed to the same dimension, and the other where each candidate is committed to a different dimension. We focus on characterisation and existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria when the core is empty. We show that if the distribution of voters’ ideal policies is continuously differentiable and has a bounded support, then an equilibrium exists if the candidates are differentiated enough. Our results for the case where the candidates have a common committed issue have implications for the literature on valence.