Functionalism cannot save the classical view of emotion.
Functionalism cannot save the classical view of emotion.
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DOI：
10.1093/scan/nsw156
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发表时间：
2017-01-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Barrett LF
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Barrett LF
拉尔夫的理论方法体现了古典观点的假设，并且通常与珍贵的（西方）人性理论一致（巴雷特，2017）。这些假设使得经典的观点“听起来是正确的”--看起来显而易见，因此令人愉悦--当与看似复杂和反直觉的建构主义方法相比时。作为一种理解情感的方法，拉尔夫采用了功能主义的一个版本。在世纪之交，面对越来越多的不确定性证据，功能主义被迫投入服务，以拯救经典的情感观。今天也是如此（关于不证实证据的列表，见巴雷特的表1，本期）。但功能主义带来了一系列哲学假设。当拉尔夫和我这样的科学家争论情绪的本质时，我们实际上是在仔细考虑这些假设的有效性（见下表1）。我在这里的目标是强调这些问题，并提出我的观点，希望推动对话向前发展。我讨论拉尔夫的古典观点的情绪，试图捍卫这些假设，而在同一时间保持响应不断积累的经验证据，呼吁他们进入怀疑。
Ralph’s theoretical approach embodies the assumptions of the classical view, and are generally consistent with a cherished (Western) theory of human nature (Barrett, 2017). These assumptions allow the classical view to ‘ring true’—to appear obvious and therefore pleasing—when compared to the seemingly complex and counter-intuitive constructionist approach. As an approach to understanding emotions, Ralph employs a version of functionalism. At the turn of the 20th century, functionalism was pressed into service to rescue the classical view of emotion in the face of mounting disconfirming evidence. And so it is today (for a list of disconfirming evidence, see Table 1 in Barrett, this issue). But functionalism brings with it a set of philosophical assumptions. When scientists like Ralph and I debate the nature of emotion, we are really deliberating over the validity of these assumptions (see Table 1, next page). My goal here is to highlight them and offer my point of view in hopes of moving the dialogue forward. I discuss Ralph’s classical view of emotion as an attempt to defend these assumptions while at the same time remaining responsive to the accumulating empirical evidence that calls them into doubt.