Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation
Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation
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DOI:
10.4314/sajpem.v25i2.31443
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发表时间:
2006-01
影响因子:
0.4
通讯作者:
Asbjørn Steglich‐Petersen
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Asbjørn Steglich‐Petersen
Abstract It is widely assumed that doxastic deliberation is transparent to the factual question of the truth of the proposition being considered for belief, and that this sets doxastic deliberation apart from practical deliberation. This feature is frequently invoked in arguments against doxastic voluntarism. I argue that transparency to factual questions occurs in practical deliberation in ways parallel to transparency in doxastic deliberation. I argue that this should make us reconsider the appeal to transparency in arguments against doxastic voluntarism, and the wider issue of distinguishing theoretical from practical rationality.