Corporate Leniency Programs and the Role of the Antitrust Authority in Detecting Collusion
Corporate Leniency Programs and the Role of the Antitrust Authority in Detecting Collusion
复制标题
公司宽大处理计划和反垄断机构在侦查共谋中的作用
DOI:
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发表时间:
2006
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
J. Harrington
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
J. Harrington
The design, implementation, and measurement of corporate leniency programs are examined with a focus on how these programs impact the discovery and penalization of cartels. This is followed with a broader discussion of detection by considering other ways in which an antitrust authority can play an active role in this critical first stage to fighting cartels. ∗This paper was commissioned for the International Symposium on "Towards an Effective Implementation of New Competition Policy" that was sponsored by the Competition Policy Research Center of the Fair Trade Commission of Japan, the 21st Century COE Program of Hitotsubashi University, and Nihon Keizei Shimbun, Inc. I am grateful to Aki Matsui, Massimo Motta, Akio Shibata, Akinori Uesugi, and Kotaro Suzumura for their comments. This research is partially supported by the National Science Foundation under grant SES-0516943.
DOI:
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.012
发表时间:
2006-11
影响因子:
1.5
作者:
Joseph E. Harrington;Joe Chen
通讯作者:
Joseph E. Harrington;Joe Chen
DOI:
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发表时间:
2007
期刊:
The Political Economy of Antitrust, Contributions to Economic Analysis 282, Ghosal, Vivek and Johan Stennek eds.
影响因子:
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作者:
Joe Chen;Joseph E.;Harrington Jr.(co-author)
通讯作者:
Harrington Jr.(co-author)