Judicial Independence: Some Evidence from the English Court of Appeal
Judicial Independence: Some Evidence from the English Court of Appeal
复制标题
司法独立：来自英国上诉法院的一些证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Fenn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Salzberger;P. Fenn
本文主要研究司法决策过程中是否存在有意识的政治干预。我们从英国上诉法院提供了新的证据，以阐明有关司法独立的理论辩论。这一证据基于这样一个事实，即从上诉法院提拔法官到上议院的程序原则上受到政治控制：大法官在提拔法官方面起着关键作用，他是内阁成员，也是政治任命的人。这些数据涉及上诉法院法官在1951-86年期间作出的公法裁决。我们使用竞争风险生存模型来确定个人法官在决定支持或反对政府的决定时的记录是否决定了他们的晋升机会，控制了他们的决策质量。
This paper is concerned with the existence or otherwise of conscious political interference with judicial decision taking. We produce new evidence from the English Court of Appeal to shed some light on the theoretical debate on judicial independence. This evidence rests on the fact that the procedure for promoting judges from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords is in principle under political control: the lord chancellor, who has a key role in the promotion of judges, is a member of the cabinet and as such a political appointee. The data relate to public law decisions made by judges in the Court of Appeal over the period 1951–86. We use a competing risks survival model to establish whether the record of individual judges in deciding for or against the government was a factor that determined their promotion chances, controlling for the quality of their decision making.