Dynamic Evaluation Design
Dynamic Evaluation Design
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动态评估设计
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Alex Smolin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alex Smolin
委托人拥有一家公司，雇佣一个生产率不确定的代理人，并设计一个动态的政策来评估他的业绩。代理观察正在进行的评估并决定何时退出。当不辞职时，代理人得到的工资与他的预期生产率成线性关系;委托人要求剩余绩效。退出后，球员获得固定的外部选择。我证明了均衡是帕累托有效的。对于一个广泛的性能技术类，均衡工资确定性地增长与任期。我的分析表明，内源性绩效评估在塑造组织中的职业生涯中发挥着重要作用。(JEL D21、D82、D83、J24、J31、J41、M51）
A principal owns a firm, hires an agent of uncertain productivity, and designs a dynamic policy for evaluating his performance. The agent observes ongoing evaluations and decides when to quit. When not quitting, the agent is paid a wage that is linear in his expected productivity; the principal claims the residual performance. After quitting, the players secure fixed outside options. I show that equilibrium is Pareto efficient. For a broad class of performance technologies, the equilibrium wage deterministically grows with tenure. My analysis suggests that endogenous performance evaluation plays an important role in shaping careers in organizations. (JEL D21, D82, D83, J24, J31, J41, M51)