Improving the security of quantum direct communication with authentication
Improving the security of quantum direct communication with authentication
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DOI：
10.1103/physreva.75.026301
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发表时间：
2006-04
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Zhan-jun Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhan-jun Zhang
Lee，Lim和Yang最近提出了两种带认证的量子直接通信协议[Phys.Rev.A73，042305（2006）]。在本文中，我们将表明，在这两个协议中，应防止的Trent知道的秘密消息。第一个协议可以被Trent使用拦截-测量-重发攻击窃听，而第二个协议可以被Trent使用简单的单量子比特测量窃听。为了修复这些泄漏，我们通过使用Pauli Z操作{sigma}{sub z}而不是原始的位翻转操作X来修改协议的原始版本。因此，我们提出的攻击可以被阻止，从而提高协议的安全性。
Two protocols of quantum direct communication with authentication [Phys. Rev. A 73, 042305 (2006)] were recently proposed by Lee, Lim, and Yang. In this paper we will show that in the two protocols the authenticator Trent should be prevented from knowing the secret message. The first protocol can be eavesdropped on by Trent using the intercept-measure-resend attack, while the second protocol can be eavesdropped on by Trent using a simple single-qubit measurement. To fix these leaks, we revise the original versions of the protocols by using the Pauli Z operation {sigma}{sub z} instead of the original bit-flip operation X. As a consequence, the attacks we present can be prevented and accordingly the protocol securities are improved.