Adoption externalities as public goods
Adoption externalities as public goods
复制标题
采用外部性作为公共物品
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(83)90012-9
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发表时间：
1983
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
Chester Spatt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Philip H. Dybvig;Chester Spatt
在以正外部性或负外部性为特征的情况下，公共利益问题自然会出现。对于正外部性，代理人通过采取行动来提供公共利益。同样，对于负外部性，代理人通过不采取行动来提供公共利益。我们考察了二元选择问题中的这些外部性，即收养外部性。在每一种情况下，政府干预都有潜在的作用，即使在不允许均衡转移的情况下也是如此，因为一个均衡帕累托支配着所有其他的均衡。我们分析了这些模型中均衡的正性和规范性，并探讨了政府干预的可能性。
A public good problem arises naturally in situations characterized by positive externalities or negative externalities. For positive externalities, agents furnish a public good by taking an action. Similarly, for negative externalities, agents furnish a public good bynottaking an action. We examine these externalities in a binary choice problem, i.e. adoption externalities. In each case, there is a potential role for government intervention, even when equilibrium transfers are not allowed, since one equilibrium Pareto dominates all others. We analyze the positive and normative features of equilibria in these models, and we explore the possibility of useful government intervention.