Mechanism Design for Resource Allocation in Networks With Intergroup Competition and Intragroup Sharing
Mechanism Design for Resource Allocation in Networks With Intergroup Competition and Intragroup Sharing
复制标题
群间竞争与群内共享网络资源分配机制设计
DOI：
10.1109/tcns.2017.2680319
复制
发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
A. Anastasopoulos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Abhinav Sinha;A. Anastasopoulos
我们考虑一个网络中的战略代理人，谁是竞争的资源分配，分为固定的群体。网络控制协议是这样的，在每个组内的代理得到共享的资源和跨组，他们争夺它。一个典型的例子是分配的数据速率在网络上的多播/多速率架构。与单播架构（这是一种特殊情况）相比，多播/多速率架构可以节省大量带宽。然而，在这种情况下，市场机制的设计需要同时处理私人和公共利益问题，而不仅仅是单一的私人利益。本文提出的机制保证了在这样的网络上社会福利最大化分配在所有纳什均衡（NE）处都实现，即，在东北全面实施。此外，它是个体理性的，即，代理人有参与该机制的动机。该机制，这是在一个准系统的方式从集中式问题的对偶开始构建，有一些有用的属性。具体而言，由于一种新的分配方案，即“径向投影”，所提出的机制，即使在可行的分配平衡。这是一个实际的必要性，任何现实的机制，因为代理必须通过一个动态的过程“学习”NE。最后，它示出了如何强大的预算平衡在平衡可以实现最小的消息空间增加作为一个附加的弱预算平衡机制。
We consider a network where strategic agents, who are contesting for allocation of resources, are divided into fixed groups. The network control protocol is such that within each group agents get to share the resource and across groups they contest for it. A prototypical example is the allocation of data rate on a network with the multicast/multirate architecture. Compared to the unicast architecture (which is a special case), the multicast/multirate architecture can result in substantial bandwidth savings. However, design of a market mechanism in such a scenario requires dealing with both private and public good problems as opposed to just private goods in unicast. The mechanism proposed in this paper ensures that social welfare maximizing allocation on such a network is realized at all Nash equilibria (NE), i.e., full implementation in NE. In addition it is individually rational, i.e., agents have an incentive to participate in the mechanism. The mechanism, which is constructed in a quasi-systematic way starting from the dual of the centralized problem, has a number of useful properties. Specifically, due to a novel allocation scheme, namely “radial projection,” the proposed mechanism results in feasible allocation even off equilibrium. This is a practical necessity for any realistic mechanism since agents have to “learn” the NE through a dynamic process. Finally, it is shown how strong budget balance at equilibrium can be achieved with a minimal increase in message space as an add-on to a weakly budget balanced mechanism.