Endogenizing Power-Sharing After Ethnonationalist Civil War
Endogenizing Power-Sharing After Ethnonationalist Civil War
复制标题
民族主义内战后内生化权力分享
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Wucherpfennig
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Wucherpfennig
最近的研究开始质疑权力分享安排是否能在民族主义内战后确保和平的有效手段。然而，由于这些安排是交战各方蓄意采取的，不仅是冲突的结果，而且是对其和平前景的直接预期，因此必须将其视为冲突的内生因素。这表明，从经验上讲，权力分享发生在和平最脆弱的地方。因此，如果处理不当，权力分享的因果效应很可能被低估。因此，我把种族不满的调解和冲突的再次发生作为共同和相互依存的过程。我将该模型应用于种族群体层面的分类数据，这些数据捕获了各种类型的权力星座，包括权力分享协议。与文献提出的批评相反，研究结果表明，一旦考虑到内生性，权力分享确实可以作为防止暴力复发的有效工具。
Recent research has come to question power-sharing arrangements as a potent means to secure peace after ethnonationalist civil war. However, because such arrangements are adopted deliberately by the belligerents not only as the result of conflict, but also in direct anticipation of their prospects for peace, they must be considered endogenous to conflict. This suggests that power-sharing occurs empirically where peace is most fragile to begin with. Consequently, if not addressed properly, the causal eect of power-sharing is likely to be underestimated. I therefore model the accommodation of ethnic grievances and the recurrence of conflict as joint and interdependent processes. I apply the model to disaggregated data at the level of ethnic groups that captures various types of power constellations, including power-sharing agreements. Against criticism put forward by the literature, the results suggest that once endogeneity is accounted for, power-sharing indeed can serve as an eective tool to prevent recurrent violence.