Action understanding as inverse planning
Action understanding as inverse planning
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cognition.2009.07.005
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发表时间：
2009-12-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Tenenbaum, Joshua B.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Baker, Chris L.;Saxe, Rebecca;Tenenbaum, Joshua B.
人类擅长推断其他代理人行为背后的精神状态，如目标、信念、欲望、情感和其他想法。提出了一种基于贝叶斯逆规划的人类行为理解建模计算框架。该框架代表了基于理性原则的意向代理人行为的直观理论：期望代理人在给定他们对世界的信念的情况下，近似理性地计划以实现他们的目标。导致代理行为的心理状态是通过使用贝叶斯推理逆转这一理性规划模型，将观察到的行动的可能性与先前的心理状态相结合来推断的。这种方法以精确的概率术语正式化为以前基于“意向立场”的行动理解的定性方法的实质[Dennett，D.C.(1987)]。故意的姿态。麻省剑桥：麻省理工学院出版社]或“目的论立场”[Gergely，G.，Nadasdy，Z.，Csibra，G.，&Biro，S.(1995)。在12个月大的时候采取有意的姿势。认知，56,165-193]。在三个使用动画刺激的代理在简单迷宫中运动的心理物理实验中，我们评估了基于不同目标先验的不同逆向规划模型对人类目标推理的预测能力。这些结果为我们简化的刺激范式中人类目标推理中的一种近似理性的推理机制提供了定量证据，并为人类观察者可以采用的目标表征的灵活性质提供了定量证据，我们讨论了我们的实验结果对现实世界中人类行为理解的影响，并建议如何将我们的框架扩展到包括其他类型的心理状态推理。例如关于信念的推断，或者推断一个实体是否是故意的代理人。(C)2009爱思唯尔B.V.保留所有权利。
Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents' actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents' behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent's behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an "intentional stance" [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a "teleological stance" [Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56,165-193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt, We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how Our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences. such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.