Optimal agency contract for incentive and control under moral hazard in dynamic electric power networks
Optimal agency contract for incentive and control under moral hazard in dynamic electric power networks
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DOI：
10.1049/iet-stg.2018.0256
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发表时间：
2019-07
期刊：
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Yasuaki Wasa;K. Hirata;K. Uchida
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yasuaki Wasa;K. Hirata;K. Uchida
提出了离散时间动态电力网络中道德风险下的最优契约机制。由于公用事业（系统运营商）不能直接在真实的时间内调整代理人（最终用户）的控制输入，以尊重个人决策，代理人的控制输入最大化自己的利润并不总是最大化社会福利。为了避免这个问题，作者引入了一个聚合器作为实用程序和代理之间的中介。由于随机干扰和代理人的自愿控制，聚合者对有缺陷的辅助服务进行补偿。为了降低补偿风险，作者首先提出了一个最优的激励/控制合同问题的聚合商的补偿。在契约理论中，这一问题通常被视为道德风险下的委托代理问题。然而，它通常是很难解决的合同问题的动态表示为离散时间同步贝尔曼方程和一个分层控制结构的Stackelberg游戏。作者接下来表明，这个问题可以通过将其视为线性指数二次高斯动态博弈并采用数值优化技术来解决。由于事先适当的支付合同，代理选择控制输入优选的聚合器。最后通过仿真验证了该契约机制的有效性。
The authors propose an optimal contract mechanism under moral hazard in discrete-time dynamic electric power networks. As the utility (system operator) cannot adjust the control input of the agents (end-users) directly in real time out of respect for individual decision–making, the agents’ control input maximising their own profit does not always maximise social welfare. To avoid the issue, the authors introduce an aggregator as intermediary between the utility and the agents. The aggregator pays compensation for defective ancillary services, which are caused by random disturbance and the agents’ voluntary control. To reduce the compensation risk, the authors first present an optimal incentive/control contract problem for the aggregator's compensation. The problem is usually regarded as a principal-agent problem under moral hazard in contract theory. However, it is generally difficult to solve a contract problem with dynamics expressed as discrete-time simultaneous Bellman equations and a hierarchical control structure as a Stackelberg game. The authors next show that the problem can be solved by regarding it as a linear-exponential-quadratic-Gaussian dynamic game and employing a numerical optimisation technique. Due to the ex-ante appropriate payment contract, the agents select control inputs preferable for the aggregator. The effectiveness of the proposed contract mechanism is finally demonstrated through simulation.