Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games
复制标题
重复博弈中的无信均衡
DOI：
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
W. Olszewski
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jeffrey C. Ely;Johannes Hörner;W. Olszewski
我们引入了一类策略，概括了在不完美的私人监控下的两个玩家的游戏中构建的例子。序贯均衡是无信念均衡，如果在每个私人历史之后，每个参与人的延续策略都是最优的，而与他对对手私人历史的信念无关。我们提供了一个简单而尖锐的特点，使用这些策略的均衡收益。虽然这样的策略支持一个大的收益集，但它们并不丰富到足以在除了囚徒困境之外的大多数博弈中产生一个民间定理，即使在噪音消失的情况下。版权所有2005年计量经济学会。
We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents' private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equilibrium payoffs using those strategies. While such strategies support a large set of payoffs, they are not rich enough to generate a folk theorem in most games besides the prisoner's dilemma, even when noise vanishes. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.