Moral judgment as information processing: an integrative review.
Moral judgment as information processing: an integrative review.
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DOI：
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01637
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Guglielmo S
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Guglielmo S
人类如何对他人的行为做出道德判断？这篇文章回顾了道德判断的主要模型，将它们组织在信息处理的总体框架内。这个框架提出了两个不同的问题：（1）什么样的输入信息引导道德判断？（2）是什么心理过程产生了这些判断？信息模型解决了第一个问题，确定了塑造道德判断的关键信息元素（包括因果关系，意向性和心理状态）。有偏信息模型的一个子类认为，对这些信息元素的感知本身是由先前的道德判断驱动的。处理模型解决了第二个问题，现有的模型集中在直觉与慎思过程的相对贡献上。本文综述了现有的道德判断模型在此框架内，并批判性地评估他们的经验和理论的理由，然后概述了一个一般的综合模型接地信息处理，并得出结论与概念和方法的建议，为未来的研究。信息处理框架提供了一个有用的理论透镜，通过它来组织现存的和未来的工作在迅速增长的领域的道德判断。
How do humans make moral judgments about others’ behavior? This article reviews dominant models of moral judgment, organizing them within an overarching framework of information processing. This framework poses two distinct questions: (1) What input information guides moral judgments? and (2) What psychological processes generate these judgments? Information Models address the first question, identifying critical information elements (including causality, intentionality, and mental states) that shape moral judgments. A subclass of Biased Information Models holds that perceptions of these information elements are themselves driven by prior moral judgments. Processing Models address the second question, and existing models have focused on the relative contribution of intuitive versus deliberative processes. This review organizes existing moral judgment models within this framework and critically evaluates them on empirical and theoretical grounds; it then outlines a general integrative model grounded in information processing, and concludes with conceptual and methodological suggestions for future research. The information-processing framework provides a useful theoretical lens through which to organize extant and future work in the rapidly growing field of moral judgment.