Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study
Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study
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与中间商的竞争均衡：实证研究
DOI：
10.2307/1058163
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发表时间：
1981
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
J. T. Uhl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Plott;J. T. Uhl
在市场体系中，公众对中间商的不信任经常发生。抵制、监管和调查中间商并不少见[3；7]。这种不受欢迎的立场有些自相矛盾，因为经济理论的应用表明，可以依靠中间商之间的竞争来保护消费者和生产者。根据公认的理论，购买和转售价格的任何差异都将反映做市所涉及的成本。尽管如此，公众的怀疑依然存在。
Public distrust of middlemen frequently occurs in market systems. Boycotts, regulations, and investigations of middlemen are not uncommon [3; 7]. This position of disfavor is somewhat paradoxical since application of economic theory suggests that competition among middlemen can be relied upon to protect consumers and producers. According to received doctrine any differences in purchase and resale prices would reflect the costs involved in market making. Nevertheless public suspicion remains.