False‐Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games: Empirical and Theoretical Analysis
False‐Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games: Empirical and Theoretical Analysis
复制标题
加权投票游戏中的假名操纵：实证和理论分析
DOI：
10.1111/coin.12096
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
V. Allan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ramoni O. Lasisi;V. Allan
加权投票游戏在多智能体系统中非常重要，因为它们在自动决策中的应用。然而，他们也不能幸免于游戏中可能存在的战略代理人操纵假名的脆弱性。假名操纵涉及代理人在几个虚假身份之间分配其重量，以增加权力。以前的工作已经考虑使用著名的Shapley-Shubik和Banzhaf幂指数进行假名操纵。当操纵者分裂成k = 2个Shapley-Shubik和Banzhaf指数的假身份时，操纵者可能获得的权力范围存在界限。到目前为止，当一个智能体分裂成k > 2个假身份时，两个指数的界限仍然是开放的。这篇文章回答了这个开放的问题，当一个代理分裂成k > 2个假身份的两个指数时，提供了四个非平凡的界限。此外，我们提出了一个新的约束的权力，操纵者可能会获得的程度时，它分裂成几个虚假的身份在一类游戏被称为过剩的投票权游戏。最后，我们补充我们的理论结果与实证评估。从我们的实验结果证实存在有益的分裂成几个假身份的两个指数，也建立分裂成两个以上的假身份是定性不同于以前已知的分裂成两个假身份。
Weighted voting games are important in multiagent systems because of their usage in automated decision making. However, they are not immune from the vulnerability of false‐name manipulation by strategic agents that may be present in the games. False‐name manipulation involves an agent splitting its weight among several false identities in anticipation of power increase. Previous works have considered false‐name manipulation using the well‐known Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf power indices. Bounds on the extent of power that a manipulator may gain exist when it splits into k = 2 false identities for both the Shapley–Shubik and Banzhaf indices. The bounds when an agent splits into k > 2 false identities, until now, have remained open for the two indices. This article answers this open problem by providing four nontrivial bounds when an agent splits into k > 2 false identities for the two indices. Furthermore, we propose a new bound on the extent of power that a manipulator may gain when it splits into several false identities in a class of games referred to as excess unanimity weighted voting games. Finally, we complement our theoretical results with empirical evaluation. Results from our experiments confirm the existence of beneficial splits into several false identities for the two indices, and also establish that splitting into more than two false identities is qualitatively different than the previously known splitting into exactly two false identities.
加权投票游戏中的假名操纵对于概率多项式时间来说是困难的
DOI：
10.1613/jair.4293
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
J. Artif. Intell. Res.
影响因子：
--
作者：
A. Rey;J. Rothe
通讯作者：
J. Rothe