Bargaining with Multinationals: Why State Capacity Matters
Bargaining with Multinationals: Why State Capacity Matters
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DOI：
10.1080/13563467.2013.872610
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发表时间：
2015-01-02
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Bakir, Caner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Bakir, Caner
国家与跨国公司（MNCs）谈判的主流模式普遍认为，谈判关系，特别是在高科技制造业，已经从对抗转变为合作。因此，有人认为，这些行为者之间很少有正式的进入谈判。然而，在这个文献中有三个主要的弱点。首先，对结果的理解仅限于投资协议的条款。这种静态观点忽略了议价过程和不投资决策的动态，这也值得解释。其次，它以跨国公司为中心，忽视了国家在国内政策制定过程中与进入谈判治理有关的特权作用。第三，它将国家视为一个整体实体，忽视了国家内部发生的讨价还价。为了解决这些问题，本文提出了一个以国家为中心的议价模型。它确定行政和体制能力是国家能力的两个关键组成部分。这是从2005年现代汽车考虑在土耳其投资15亿美元建设汽车工厂开始的。研究表明，国家在国内政策制定过程中的治理能力会影响进入议价的结果：当国家能力较弱时，跨国公司更有可能做出不投资的决定。
Dominant models of bargaining between states and multinational corporations (MNCs) have widely held that bargaining relations, especially in high-technology manufacturing, have changed from confrontational to cooperative. It is consequently argued that there is little formal entry bargaining among these actors. However, there are three primary weaknesses in this literature. First, the understanding of outcomes is limited to the terms of investment agreements. This static view ignores the dynamics of bargaining processes and decisions not to invest, which also deserve explanation. Second, it is MNC-centric, ignoring state's privileged role in relation to the governance of entry bargaining in domestic policy-making processes. Third, it views state as a monolithic entity, ignoring the bargaining that occurs inside states. To redress these issues, this article offers a state-centric bargaining model. It identifies administrative and institutional capacity as two critical components of state capacity. It chooses the entry bargaining from 2005, when Hyundai Motors Corporation considered establishing a USD1.5 billion car-manufacturing plant in Turkey. It shows that state capacity in the governance of a domestic policy-making process affects the outcome of entry bargaining: When state capacity is weak, an MNC's decision not to invest is a more likely outcome.