Computation and cognition: issues in the foundations of cognitive science
Computation and cognition: issues in the foundations of cognitive science
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计算和认知：认知科学基础问题
DOI：
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发表时间：
1980
影响因子：
29.3
通讯作者：
Z. Pylyshyn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Z. Pylyshyn
心灵的计算观依赖于关于计算和认知之间基本相似性的某些直觉。我们研究了其中的一些直觉，并认为它们来自这样一个事实，即计算机和人类有机体都是物理系统，其行为被正确地描述为由作用于符号表示的规则所支配。这种观点的一些影响进行了讨论。有人建议，这种方法的一个基本假设（“专有词汇假设”）是，有一个自然的人类功能域（大致是我们直观地与感知，推理和行动相关联），可以专门在一个正式的符号或算法词汇或分析水平。如果把心理活动看作是计算的话，那么要把它作为解释性理论的基础，本文的大部分内容都详细阐述了需要满足的各种条件。这种观点的连贯性取决于在功能和功能之间存在原则性的区别，前者的解释需要我们对内部表征进行解释，后者我们可以恰当地描述为仅仅是实例化因果物理或生物定律。在本文中，这种区分是基于经验的一个方法标准，称为“认知不可穿透性条件”。如果功能不受目标、信念、推理、隐性知识等纯认知因素的影响，那么这些功能就被称为认知上不可渗透的，这样的标准使得我们有可能从经验上将心智的固定能力（称为“功能结构”）与特定场合使用的特定表征和算法区分开来。为了使计算理论避免成为特别的，它们必须有效地处理“自由度”问题，限制它们在事后可以任意调整以适应某些特定观测集的程度。这反过来又要求独立验证固定的架构功能和算法。有人认为，许多当代模型中隐含的建筑假设与认知不可穿透性条件相冲突，因为所需的固定功能显然对隐性知识和目标敏感。文章最后对计算认知理论的发展提出了一些策略性建议。
Abstract The computational view of mind rests on certain intuitions regarding the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. We examine some of these intuitions and suggest that they derive from the fact that computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. Some of the implications of this view are discussed. It is suggested that a fundamental hypothesis of this approach (the “proprietary vocabulary hypothesis”) is that there is a natural domain of human functioning (roughly what we intuitively associate with perceiving, reasoning, and acting) that can be addressed exclusively in terms of a formal symbolic or algorithmic vocabulary or level of analysis. Much of the paper elaborates various conditions that need to be met if a literal view of mental activity as computation is to serve as the basis for explanatory theories. The coherence of such a view depends on there being a principled distinction between functions whose explanation requires that we posit internal representations and those that we can appropriately describe as merely instantiating causal physical or biological laws. In this paper the distinction is empirically grounded in a methodological criterion called the “cognitive impenetrability condition.” Functions are said to be cognitively impenetrable if they cannot be influenced by such purely cognitive factors as goals, beliefs, inferences, tacit knowledge, and so on. Such a criterion makes it possible to empirically separate the fixed capacities of mind (called its “functional architecture”) from the particular representations and algorithms used on specific occasions. In order for computational theories to avoid being ad hoc, they must deal effectively with the “degrees of freedom” problem by constraining the extent to which they can be arbitrarily adjusted post hoc to fit some particular set of observations. This in turn requires that the fixed architectural function and the algorithms be independently validated. It is argued that the architectural assumptions implicit in many contemporary models run afoul of the cognitive impenetrability condition, since the required fixed functions are demonstrably sensitive to tacit knowledge and goals. The paper concludes with some tactical suggestions for the development of computational cognitive theories.