On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities
On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities
复制标题
论具有外部性的经济体系的核心
DOI：
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发表时间：
1969
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Shubik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
L. Shapley;M. Shubik
摘要：该文件涉及对共同企业社会稳定性的调查，以分配生产性经济活动外部影响的成本或收益。社会稳定意味着所有受影响各方的联盟或潜在联盟同时得到满足。这相当于处于相应多人游戏的核心。一些简单的污染型模型，具有广泛的多样性的核心行为进行检查。税收和补贴计划进行了讨论，在面对这两种类型的外部性，其实现帕累托最优的潜力。（作者）
Abstract : The document covers an investigation of the social stability of joint undertakings to allocate costs or benefits of the external effects of productive economic activity. Social stability is taken to mean that all coalitions or potential coalitions of affected parties are satisfied simultaneously. This is equivalent to being in the core of the corresponding multiperson game. A number of simple pollution-type models that have a wide diversity of core behavior are examined. Tax and subsidy schemes are discussed in regard to their potential for the achievement of Pareto optimality in the face of externalities of both types. (Author)