Detection and mitigation of pilot spoofing attack
Detection and mitigation of pilot spoofing attack
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DOI：
10.1109/acssc.2017.8335643
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发表时间：
2017-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jitendra Tugnait
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jitendra Tugnait
在时分双工（TDD）多天线系统中，可以使用反向训练来估计信道状态信息（CSI）。当在训练阶段期间，对手（欺骗者）也发送与合法接收器相同的训练（导频）信号时，发生导频污染（欺骗）攻击。这污染了信道估计并改变了合法的波束成形设计，从而促进了窃听。最近的一种方法提出了在合法接收端将随机序列叠加在训练序列上，然后使用最小描述长度（MDL）准则来检测导频污染攻击。在本文中，我们增加了这种方法与合法的接收机和窃听信道的联合估计，并安全波束形成，以减轻导频欺骗的影响。我们考虑两种情况：（i）spokesman仅发送导频信号，（ii）spokesman还将随机序列添加到其导频。所提出的缓解方法是通过模拟说明。
In a time-division duplex (TDD) multiple antenna system, the channel state information (CSI) can be estimated using reverse training. A pilot contamination (spoofing) attack occurs when during the training phase, an adversary (spoofer) also sends identical training (pilot) signal as that of the legitimate receiver. This contaminates channel estimation and alters the legitimate beamforming design, facilitating eavesdropping. A recent approach proposed superimposing a random sequence on the training sequence at the legitimate receiver and then using the minimum description length (MDL) criterion to detect pilot contamination attack. In this paper we augment this approach with joint estimation of both legitimate receiver and eavesdropper channels, and secure beamforming, to mitigate the effects of pilot spoofing. We consider two cases: (i) the spoofer transmits only the pilot signal, (ii) the spoofer also adds a random sequence to its pilot. The proposed mitigation approach is illustrated via simulations.