Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution
Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution
复制标题
战略性解散议会
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Stephen M. Swindle
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kaare W. Strøm;Stephen M. Swindle
在议会民主制中，一项重要的议程权力是解散议会的自由裁量权。我们认为，宪法规则和政治环境的变化将系统地影响提前选举的频率。我们假设，在一党制政府下，当国家元首的作用微不足道，当议会和内阁都不能阻止解散时，当少数党政府执政时，当国家元首可以单方面解散时，以及在宪法任期后期，解散将更加频繁。使用标准的逻辑和考克斯比例风险技术，我们测试这些期望在一个汇总的时间序列设置对大多数经合组织议会民主国家的观察，1960年至1995年。我们发现，议会解散更频繁地在宪法任期的早期，在少数政府，当国家元首扮演一个微不足道的角色，当议会或内阁不参与。
An important agenda power in parliamentary democracies is the discretion over the dissolution of parliament. We argue that variation in constitutional rules and the political environment will systematically affect the frequency of early elections. We hypothesize that dissolution will be more frequent under single-party governments, when the head of state plays an insignificant role, when neither parliament nor the cabinet can inhibit dissolution, when minority governments are in power, when the head of state can dissolve unilaterally, and later in the constitutional term. Using standard logistic and Cox-proportional hazard techniques, we test these expectations in a pooled time-series setting against observations of most OECD parliamentary democracies for the years 1960–1995. We find that parliamentary dissolutions are more frequent earlier in the constitutional term, under minority governments, when the head of state plays an insignificant role, and when the parliament or the cabinet is not involved.