Education, social mobility, and the mismatch of talents
Education, social mobility, and the mismatch of talents
复制标题
教育、社会流动和人才错配
DOI：
10.1007/s00199-016-1027-7
复制
发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Yuki Uchida
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Houdayer;Y. Isono;永田大輔;Yusuke Isono;永田大輔;Yusuke Isono;永田大輔;磯野優介;永田大輔;磯野優介;磯野優介;永田大輔;永田大輔;磯野優介;磯野優介;永田大輔;永田大輔;永田大輔;永田大輔;松永伸太朗・永田大輔;永田大輔・松永伸太朗;永田大輔・松永伸太朗;永田大輔・松永伸太朗;永田大輔;永田大輔;永田大輔;永田大輔;永田大輔・守屋淳・奥田知志・岡田美智男・竹内章郎・荒巻りか・綿貫公平・中嶋哲彦・川口洋誉・木戸口正宏・宮下与兵衞・中村麻由子他;鹿野祐介;河野正治;Yuki Uchida
本研究提出了一个两阶层、两代同堂的社会流动模型，该模型的特点是人才错配抑制了社会流动。流动性随着两个阶层之间私立教育差距的扩大而减少，而随着公共教育支出的增加而增加。在此框架内，研究考虑了对公共教育的投票，并表明，当富人的政治权力强大时，政府实施低再分配支出，这反过来又导致了跨代社会流动的周期性运动。
This study presents a two-class, overlapping-generation model featuring social mobility inhibited by the mismatch of talents. Mobility decreases as the private education gap between the two classes widens, whereas it increases with increased public education spending. Within this framework, the study considers voting on public education and shows that when the political power of the rich is strong, the government implements low redistributive expenditures, which in turn induces a cyclical motion of social mobility across generations.