Cache-Timing Attacks and Shared Contexts ?
Cache-Timing Attacks and Shared Contexts ?
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发表时间：
2011
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通讯作者：
B. Brumley;Nicola Tuveri
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作者：
B. Brumley;Nicola Tuveri
高速缓存定时攻击通过利用从存储器检索数据的延迟基本上由处理器的高速缓存中的所述数据的可用性支配的事实来恢复算法状态。需要对这些攻击采取有效的对策。共享内存上下文是一种重用动态分配的内存的机制。本文重点关注OpenSSL中的公钥加密及其共享上下文的实现，研究了共享上下文帮助缓解缓存计时攻击的能力。结果对这种方法是悲观的。
Cache-timing attacks recover algorithm state by exploiting the fact that the latency of retrieving data from memory is essentially governed by the availability of said data in the processor's cache. E- cient and eective countermeasures to these attacks are needed. A shared memory context is a mechanism for reusing dynamically allocated mem- ory. Focusing on public key cryptography within OpenSSL and its im- plementation of shared contexts, this paper examines the ability of a shared context to aid in mitigation of cache-timing attacks. The results are pessimistic towards this approach.