Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia
Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.270641
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发表时间：
2001-03
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Joseph P. H. Fan;T. Wong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Joseph P. H. Fan;T. Wong
在新兴市场，公司所有权的集中造成了控股股东和少数股东之间的代理冲突。传统的公司控制机制，如董事会和收购，在控制代理问题方面通常很薄弱。本研究探讨是否可以聘请外部独立审计师作为监督和债券机制，以减轻代理冲突。使用广泛的样本，从八个东亚经济体的公司，我们的文件，公司更有可能聘请五大审计师时，他们更容易受到嵌入在他们的最终所有权结构的代理问题。一个可能的原因是，这种记录的关系之间的审计师选择和代理问题是更明显的比不一致的结果，使用美国和英国。数据显示，东亚的替代治理机制有限。此外，在东亚地区存在代理问题的审计对象中，五大审计师收取的费用较高，并设置了较低的审计修改门槛，而非五大审计师则没有。综合来看，有证据表明，新兴市场的五大审计师确实在公司治理方面发挥了作用。
In emerging markets, the concentration of corporate ownership has created agency conflicts between controlling owners and minority shareholders. Conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeovers are typically weak in containing the agency problem. This study examines whether external independent auditors could be employed as monitors and as bonding mechanisms to alleviate the agency conflict. Using a broad sample of firms from eight East Asian economies, we document that firms are more likely to employ Big Five auditors when they are more subject to the agency problem imbedded in their ultimate ownership structure. One possible reason that this documented relation between auditor choice and the agency problem is more evident than the inconsistent results using U.S. and U.K. data is that alternative governance mechanisms are limited in East Asia. In addition, among East Asian auditees subject to the agency problem, Big Five auditors charge a higher fee and set a lower audit modification threshold while non-Big Five auditors do not. Taken together, the evidence suggests that Big Five auditors in emerging markets do have a corporate governance role.