Rotten apples: An investigation of the prevalence and predictors of teacher cheating

Rotten apples: An investigation of the prevalence and predictors of teacher cheating
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DOI:
10.1162/00335530360698441
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发表时间:
2003-08-01
影响因子:
13.7
通讯作者:
Levitt, SD
Levitt, SD
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Jacob, BA;Levitt, SD

文献摘要

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我们开发了一种检测教师作弊的算法,该算法结合了学生在课堂上意外的考试成绩波动和可疑的答案模式的信息。根据芝加哥公立学校的数据,我们估计,每年至少有4- 5%的小学教室发生教师或管理人员在标准化考试中作弊的严重案件。观察到的作弊频率似乎对激励措施的相对较小的变化有强烈的反应。我们的研究结果强调了这样一个事实,即高功率的激励系统,特别是那些与明线规则,可能会导致意想不到的行为扭曲,如作弊。然而,统计分析可能提供一种手段,可以发现非法行为,尽管犯罪者尽最大努力使其保持秘密。
We develop an algorithm for detecting teacher cheating that combines information on unexpected test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answers for students in a classroom. Using data from the Chicago public schools, we estimate that serious cases of teacher or administrator cheating on standardized tests occur in a minimum of 4-5 percent of elementary school classrooms annually. The observed frequency of cheating appears to respond strongly to relatively minor changes in incentives. Our results highlight the fact that high-powered incentive systems, especially those with bright line rules, may induce unexpected behavioral distortions such as cheating. Statistical analysis, however, may provide a means of detecting illicit acts, despite the best attempts of perpetrators to keep them clandestine.