Exploiting PUF Variation to Detect Fault Injection Attacks
Exploiting PUF Variation to Detect Fault Injection Attacks
复制标题
利用 PUF 变化检测故障注入攻击
DOI：
10.1109/ddecs54261.2022.9770154
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Taouil
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Troya Çağıl Köylü;Luíza C. Garaffa;C. Reinbrecht;Mahdi Zahedi;S. Hamdioui;M. Taouil
物联网（IoT）设备的大规模部署使其容易受到物理篡改攻击，例如故障注入。这种类型的硬件攻击非常流行，因为它们通常不需要复杂的设备或高专业知识。因此，重要的是要保护物联网设备免受它们的侵害。在这项工作中，我们提出了一种新的高灵活性和低开销的故障注入攻击检测器。我们的解决方案基于许多物联网设备中使用的安全原语的重用，即环形振荡器（RO）物理不可克隆功能（PUF）。结果表明，对于基于电压和时钟操作的大多数常见故障注入攻击，我们获得了很高的检测效率和无误报。
The massive deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) devices makes them vulnerable against physical tampering attacks, such as fault injection. These kind of hardware attacks are very popular as they typically do not require complex equipment or high expertise. Hence, it is important that IoT devices are protected against them. In this work, we present a novel fault injection attack detector with high flexibility and low overhead. Our solution is based on the reuse of a security primitive used in many IoT devices, i.e., ring oscillator (RO) physically unclonable function (PUF). Our results show that we obtain a high detection effectiveness and no false alarms against most popular fault injection attacks based on voltage and clock manipulations.