Insider Trading and Earnings Management
Insider Trading and Earnings Management
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02075.x
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发表时间：
2008-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Sawicki;Keshab Shrestha
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Sawicki;Keshab Shrestha
本文分析了盈余管理与内幕交易之间的关系，具体考察了操纵性应计利润与内幕交易和估值之间的关系。我们发现了内部人在买入时向下管理收益和在卖出时向上管理收益的有力证据。在边际基础上，价值型（高账面市值比）公司与成长型（低账面市值比）公司相比，管理他们的收益向上，与信号假说一致。然而，在平均基础上，情况正好相反，符合机会主义假设。版权所有（c）2008作者杂志汇编（c）2008布莱克威尔出版有限公司。
This paper analyzes the relationship between earnings management and insider trading, specifically investigating whether discretionary accruals are related to insider trading and valuation. We find strong evidence of insiders managing earnings downward when buying and managing earnings upward when selling. On the marginal basis, value (high book-to-market value) firms manage their earnings upward compared to growth (low book-to-market value) firms, consistent with a signaling hypothesis. However, the opposite is true on the average basis, consistent with an opportunistic hypothesis. Copyright (c) 2008 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.