The role of logic in reason, inference, and decision
The role of logic in reason, inference, and decision
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逻辑在推理、推理和决策中的作用
DOI：
10.1017/s0140525x00015855
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发表时间：
1983
影响因子：
29.3
通讯作者：
H. Kyburg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Kyburg
在理性信念理论中，规范性要素和描述性要素之间存在着一种张力。这种紧张关系反映在心理学和决策理论以及哲学的工作中。合理性的准则应该根据人类的可行性来制定。但是，理性既有规范性的内容，也有描述性的内容。可以提出一些与演绎和归纳逻辑有关的问题。是否存在被绝对接受的完整的信念陈述？当陈述变得非常有可能时，是否应该接受它们？理性强加于这些信念的结构是什么？它们是一致的吗？它们是演绎关闭的吗？理性接受取决于什么参数（如果有的话）？接受的陈述怎么会因为新的证据而被拒绝呢？置信度应该满足概率演算吗？对概率演算的遵从是否穷尽了可以施加在部分信念上的理性约束？随着新证据的获得，信念是否应该按照雅阁定理变化？决策是否雅阁期望效用最大化原则？他们应该吗？一套系统的答案，这些问题的基础上开发的概率规则的接受和区间值逻辑概率的概念，根据该概率是基于已知的频率。这导致了有限的演绎闭合，只要求有限的一致性，并拒绝贝叶斯定理作为普遍适用于信念的变化。如果有新的证据，也有可能推翻以前接受的说法。
There is a tension between normative and descriptive elements in the theory of rational belief. This tension has been reflected in work in psychology and decision theory as well as in philosophy. Canons of rationality should be tailored to what is humanly feasible. But rationality has normative content as well as descriptive content. A number of issues related to both deductive and inductive logic can be raised. Are there full beliefs-statements that are categorically accepted? Should statements be accepted when they become overwhelmingly probable? What is the structure imposed on these beliefs by rationality? Are they consistent? Are they deductively closed? What parameters, if any, does rational acceptance depend on? How can accepted statements come to be rejected on new evidence? Should degrees of belief satisfy the probability calculus? Does conformity to the probability calculus exhaust the rational constraints that can be imposed on partial beliefs? With the acquisition of new evidence, should beliefs change in accord with Bayes' theorem? Are decisions made in accord with the principle of maximizing expected utility? Should they be? A systematic set of answers to these questions is developed on the basis of a probabilistic rule of acceptance and a conception of interval-valued logical probability according to which probabilities are based on known frequencies. This leads to limited deductive closure, a demand for only limited consistency, and the rejection of Bayes' theorem as universally applicable to changes of belief. It also becomes possible, given new evidence, to reject previously accepted statements.