A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation
复制标题
明显的策略验证实施的启示原则
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Andrew Mackenzie
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文献类型：
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作者：
Andrew Mackenzie
我们证明了，如果一个随机（社会选择）规则具有明显的防策略（OSP）实现（Li，2016），那么它通过一个随机圆桌机制具有这样的实现，在该机制中，管理员随机选择一个游戏形式，其中代理人轮流公开宣布他们的私人信息。当仅限于确定性规则时，我们的结果通过放松所有回忆要求并允许所有游戏树与正规形式兼容来改进其他最近的启示原则（Alos-Ferrer and Ritzberger，2016）;我们还使用涉及混合策略和行为策略的新解决方案概念建立了对玩家随机化的鲁棒性。我们使用我们的结果来证明卡罗尔（2017）的顺序机制的合理性，并且我们使用确定性圆桌机制和普通的防策略性提供了确定性规则的简单表征。
We prove that if a stochastic (social choice) rule has an obviously strategy-proof (OSP) implementation (Li, 2016), then it has such an implementation through a randomized round table mechanism, where the administrator randomly selects a game form in which the agents take turns making public announcements about their private information. When restricted to deterministic rules, our result improves upon other recent revelation principles by relaxing all recall requirements and by allowing all game trees compatible with normal forms (Alos-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016); we also establish robustness to player randomization using novel solution concepts involving mixed strategies and behavioral strategies. We use our result to provide a justification for ordinal mechanisms in the spirit of Carroll (2017), and we provide a simple characterization of the deterministic rules with OSP-implementations using deterministic round table mechanisms and ordinary strategy-proofness.