Gentrification, Property Tax Limitation, and Displacement
Gentrification, Property Tax Limitation, and Displacement
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DOI：
10.1177/1078087416666959
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发表时间：
2018-01
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
I. Martin;Kevin Beck
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
I. Martin;Kevin Beck
长期以来，学者们一直认为，中产阶级化可能会导致长期房主的房产税增加，从而取代他们，包括美国最高法院在内的政策制定者也将这一观点作为限制住宅房产税增长的州法律的理由。我们通过将收入动态小组研究与十年一次的人口普查级别的高档化措施和1987年至2009年期间的州级财产税政策的新数据集结合起来，验证了以下假设：高档化通过增加财产税直接取代房主，以及财产税限制保护高档化社区的居民免受流离失所。我们发现一些证据表明，财产税压力会引发房主的非自愿迁移，但没有证据表明，这种迁移在士绅化社区比其他地方更常见，也没有证据表明财产税限制保护了士绅化社区的长期房主。我们确实发现了中产阶级化直接取代租房者的证据。
Scholars have long argued that gentrification may displace long-term homeowners by causing their property taxes to increase, and policy makers, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have cited this argument as a justification for state laws that limit the increase of residential property taxes. We test the hypotheses that gentrification directly displaces homeowners by increasing their property taxes, and that property tax limitation protects residents of gentrifying neighborhoods from displacement, by merging the Panel Study of Income Dynamics with a decennial Census-tract-level measure of gentrification and a new data set on state-level property tax policy covering the period 1987 to 2009. We find some evidence that property tax pressure can trigger involuntary moves by homeowners, but no evidence that such displacement is more common in gentrifying neighborhoods than elsewhere, nor that property tax limitation protects long-term homeowners in gentrifying neighborhoods. We do find evidence that gentrification directly displaces renters.