Audit probability versus effectiveness: The Beckerian approach revisited
Audit probability versus effectiveness: The Beckerian approach revisited
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审计概率与有效性：重新审视贝克尔方法
DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12062
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Matthew D. Rablen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Matthew D. Rablen
贝克的税收合规方法考察了税务机关如何通过权衡审计概率和未申报税收的罚款率来最大化社会福利。本文提供了另一种方法来考察政府委托税务机关实现预期收入最大化的私人最优行为。税务机关可以权衡审计概率和审计有效性，但短期内罚款率是固定的。研究发现，税务机关的私人最优审计策略并不能使自愿合规最大化，而且自愿合规作为税务机关预算的函数是非单调的。最后，税务机关对未申报税种的私下最优有效罚款率不超过内部最优的两倍。
The Beckerian approach to tax compliance examines how a tax authority can maximize social welfare by trading-off audit probability against the fine rate on undeclared tax. This paper offers an alternative examination of the privately optimal behavior of a tax authority tasked by government to maximize expected revenue. The tax authority is able to trade-off audit probability against audit effectiveness, but takes the fine rate as fixed in the short run. I find that the tax authority's privately optimal audit strategy does not maximize voluntary compliance, and that voluntary compliance is nonmonotonic as a function of the tax authority's budget. Finally, the tax authority's privately optimal effective fine rate on undeclared tax does not exceed two at interior optima.