Social evolution leads to persistent corruption
Social evolution leads to persistent corruption
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1900078116
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发表时间：
2019-07-02
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Sigmund, Karl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lee, Joung-Hun;Iwasa, Yoh;Sigmund, Karl
惩罚搭便车者的机构可以维持合作。然而，如果不密切监督，这些机构往往会被腐败破坏。监测可以支持执行确保合作的具有约束力的协定，但这通常是有代价的。忽视监督和将机构的廉正视为理所当然的诱惑导致腐败的爆发和合作的破裂。我们模拟相应的机制，通过进化博弈论，使用分析方法和数值模拟，并发现它会导致持续或阻尼振荡。结果证实了腐败普遍存在的观点，而透明度是减少腐败的主要因素。
Cooperation can be sustained by institutions that punish free-riders. Such institutions, however, tend to be subverted by corruption if they are not closely watched. Monitoring can uphold the enforcement of binding agreements ensuring cooperation, but this usually comes at a price. The temptation to skip monitoring and take the institution's integrity for granted leads to outbreaks of corruption and the breakdown of cooperation. We model the corresponding mechanism by means of evolutionary game theory, using analytical methods and numerical simulations, and find that it leads to sustained or damped oscillations. The results confirm the view that corruption is endemic and transparency a major factor in reducing it.