Information, Holdouts, and Land Assembly
Information, Holdouts, and Land Assembly
复制标题
信息、抵抗和土地整合
DOI：
10.1006/juec.1995.1036
复制
发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
W. Strange
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Strange
摘要本文求解了一个土地征用博弈的均衡问题。有多个完全贝叶斯均衡，但只有一个不涉及弱劣势策略。平衡有三个重要特征。首先，开发商的报价缺乏信息。因此，土地所有者的还价只取决于他们的先前条件。其次，存在一个“钉子户”问题；较小的土地所有者要求每英亩土地的价格更高。这意味着，当土地所有者多的时候，如果达成协议，代价会更大，互惠的协议更容易被错过。第三，当土地所有者的要价是战略互补时，一些土地所有者可以被诱导接受低出价，因为这导致其他土地所有者降低自己的要价。
Abstract This paper solves for the equilibria of a land assembly game. There are multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria, but only one involves no play of weakly dominated strategies. The equilibrium has three important characteristics. First, the develop′s bid is uninformative. The counteroffers of the landowners depend, therefore, only on their priors. Second, there is a holdout problem; smaller landowners ask larger per acre prices for their land. This means that when there are many landowners, the price will be larger if there is an agreement, and mutually beneficial agreements will more frequently be missed. Third, when the asking prices of the landowners are strategic complements, some landowners can be induced to accept a low bid because this leads other landowners to moderate their own asking prices.