Behavioral incentives in a vaccination-dilemma setting with optional treatment
Behavioral incentives in a vaccination-dilemma setting with optional treatment
复制标题
DOI：
10.1103/physreve.100.062402
复制
发表时间：
2019-12-04
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Tanimoto, Jun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kabir, K. M. Ariful;Jusup, Marko;Tanimoto, Jun
社会困境是个人在自私利益和公共利益之间做出选择的情况。其中一个例子是疫苗接种困境，其中一个人付费接种疫苗不仅可以保护自己，还可以通过帮助维持一种称为群体免疫的共同利益来保护自己和他人。然而，人们有强烈的动机放弃疫苗接种，从而避免相关成本，同时享受群体免疫的保护。为了分析疫苗接种困境中的行为激励，在这种情况下，感染者可以选择一种治疗方法，我们通过将疾病传播模型与治疗和进化决策模型结合起来，将流行病学和博弈论方法结合起来。广泛的数值模拟表明，疫苗特性在控制治疗采用方面比治疗本身的成本更重要。后者的主要影响是昂贵的治疗刺激了疫苗接种，这有点令人惊讶，但社会却付出了一点代价。更令人惊讶的是，疫苗和治疗之间在减少最终流行病规模方面真正发挥协同作用的余地非常小。我们还发现，相对于以个人为中心的决策，以社会为中心的决策有助于保护群体免疫，但后者在开发新型疫苗方面可能更好。这些结果指出了有用的政策建议以及有趣的未来研究方向。
Social dilemmas are situations wherein individuals choose between selfish interest and common good. One example of this is the vaccination dilemma, in which an individual who vaccinates at a cost protects not only himself but also others by helping maintain a common good called herd immunity. There is, however, a strong incentive to forgo vaccination, thus avoiding the associated cost, all the while enjoying the protection of herd immunity. To analyze behavioral incentives in a vaccination-dilemma setting in which an optional treatment is available to infected individuals, we combined epidemiological and game-theoretic methodologies by coupling a disease-spreading model with treatment and an evolutionary decision-making model. Extensive numerical simulations show that vaccine characteristics are more important in controlling the treatment adoption than the cost of treatment itself. The main effect of the latter is that expensive treatment incentivizes vaccination, which somewhat surprisingly comes at a little cost to society. More surprising is that the margin for a true synergy between vaccine and treatment in reducing the final epidemic size is very small. We furthermore find that society-centered decision making helps protect herd immunity relative to individual-centered decision making, but the latter may be better in establishing a novel vaccine. These results point to useful policy recommendations as well as to intriguing future research directions.