Uncertainty, Delegation and Incentives
Uncertainty, Delegation and Incentives
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不确定性、授权和激励
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.998339
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Heikki Rantakari
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Heikki Rantakari
偏好的不完全可收缩性如何影响契约关系的治理？我们分析了一个最优决策在签约时未知的两方决策问题。因此，各方不需要直接就决策签订合同，而需要设计一份合同，以便在未来促成良好的决策。我们研究环境的不确定性、现有绩效衡量标准的质量和临时信息获取如何影响权力分配、绩效薪酬的使用和直接控制的共同确定。我们使用模型的结果来阐明(i)在高管薪酬和特许经营工作中发现的关于风险激励权衡的相互矛盾的经验证据，（ii）组织设计中的互补性，以及（iii）授权选择的决定因素。
How does imperfect contractibility of preferences influence the governance of a contractual relationship? We analyze a two-party decision-making problem where the optimal decision is unknown at the time of contracting. In consequence, instead of contracting on the decision directly, the parties need to design a contract that will induce good decision-making in the future. We examine how environmental uncertainty, quality of available performance measures and interim access to information influence the joint determination of the allocation of authority, use of performance pay and direct controls. We use the results from the model to cast light on (i) the conflicting empirical evidence on the risk-incentives tradeoff found in work on executive compensation and franchising, (ii) complementarities in organizational design and (iii) determinants of the choice to delegate.