A Theory of Loopholes
A Theory of Loopholes
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漏洞理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
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通讯作者：
L. Katz
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文献类型：
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作者：
L. Katz
众所周知，法律充满漏洞。一般认为原因在于法律文本与法律目的之间的分歧。据推测，实际限制使得法律不可避免地过度或不足。人们认为，利用漏洞的律师是在利用这种过度包容性和包容性不足。本文提供了不同的视角。大多数漏洞与规则的过度包容性或包容性不足无关。通过探索最清楚地揭示正在发生的事情的特定规则子集可以最好地看到这一点：投票规则。阿罗著名定理告诉我们，所有半途而废的投票规则都容易受到议程操纵的影响。从根本上说，事实证明，所有法律规则都类似于投票规则，所有漏洞利用都类似于议程操纵。与精明的议员一样，利用漏洞的律师的努力不应该受到批评、制裁或以其他方式受挫。
Laws are known to be replete with loopholes. The reason is generally thought to lie in the divergence between the text and the purpose of a law. Practical constraints supposedly make laws unavoidably over‐ or underinclusive. Lawyers who exploit loopholes are thought to be taking advantage of that over‐ and underinclusiveness. This essay offers a different perspective. Most loopholes have nothing to do with the over‐ or underinclusiveness of rules. This is best seen by exploring a particular subset of rules that reveal most clearly what is going on: the rules of voting. Arrow’s famous theorem teaches us that all halfway decent voting rules are vulnerable to agenda manipulation. Fundamentally, it will turn out, all legal rules are analogous to voting rules and all loophole exploitation analogous to agenda manipulation. The loophole‐exploiting lawyer no more deserves to be criticized, sanctioned, or otherwise frustrated in his efforts than does the shrewd parliamentarian.