The British experience with intelligence accountability
The British experience with intelligence accountability
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英国情报问责的经验
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Phythian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Phythian
本文通过分析现有的主要机制——议会情报和安全委员会——来评估英国在情报问责方面的经验。它讨论了提出监督建议的背景，围绕新监督机构性质的辩论，并评估了委员会在其存在的第一个十年中的表现。报告的结论是，虽然委员会在情报和安全部门的问责制方面取得了一些重要进展，但仍然存在重大的限制和弱点，其中许多在委员会2003年对伊拉克大规模杀伤性武器战前情报的调查和报告中很明显。在这方面，该条详细讨论的关于监督机构是否应具有选择委员会地位的辩论仍然十分重要。
This article assesses the British experience with intelligence accountability through an analysis of the principal mechanism that exists to provide for it – the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee. It discusses the context within which oversight proposals emerged, the debate surrounding the nature of the new oversight body, and assesses the performance of the Committee over the first decade of its existence. It concludes that while the Committee has secured some important advances with regard to the accountability of the intelligence and security services, there are nevertheless significant limitations and weaknesses, many of which were evident in the Committee's 2003 investigation and report into pre-war intelligence on Iraqi WMD. In this context, the debate as to whether the oversight body should have select committee status, discussed at length in the article, remains highly relevant.