Coalitional Power and Public Goods
Coalitional Power and Public Goods
复制标题
联合权力与公共物品
DOI：
10.1086/323275
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
R. Vohra
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Debraj Ray;R. Vohra
我们研究的是当所有的代理人都有完整的信息并且可以签订有约束力的协议时，公共产品的供给。这一框架与基于隐藏信息或自愿提供的搭便车问题的传统观点形成鲜明对比。我们关注的是联盟形成作为一个潜在的低效率的来源。为此，我们提出了一个均衡联盟结构的概念，该概念基于这样一个假设，即形成的每个联盟都是在对全社会联盟结构的合理预测下形成的。在一个简单的模型中，我们描述了（唯一的）均衡联盟结构。只有在某些情况下，均衡才涉及充分合作，从而有效地提供公共产品。在其他情况下，均衡由几个联盟和低效的供给组成。然而，效率低下的程度和可能的联盟数量是有限的。
We study the provision of public goods when all agents have complete information and can write binding agreements. This framework is in deliberate contrast to a traditional view of the free‐rider problem based on hidden information or voluntary provision. We focus on coalition formation as a potential source of inefficiency. To this end, we develop a notion of an equilibrium coalition structure, based on the assumption that each coalition that forms does so under a rational prediction of the society‐wide coalition structure. In a simple model, we characterize the (unique) equilibrium coalition structure. Only in some cases does the equilibrium involve full cooperation, resulting in efficient provision of the public good. In other cases, the equilibrium consists of several coalitions and inefficient provision. However, the degree of inefficiency and the number of possible coalitions are bounded.