Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity.
Transient nature of cooperation by pay-it-forward reciprocity.
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DOI：
10.1038/srep19471
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发表时间：
2016-01-20
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Masuda N
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Horita Y;Takezawa M;Kinjo T;Nakawake Y;Masuda N
人类经常把别人的善意转发给陌生人，这种现象被称为上游或转发间接互惠。一些实地观察和实验室实验发现，在社会困境的情况下，合作行为链持续存在，这证明了“向前支付”的互惠性。然而，从理论上讲，基于“向前支付”互惠的合作是不可持续的。我们进行了一个间接互惠博弈的实验室实验（即，连锁送礼游戏）在大规模的团体规模和时间方面。我们发现，合作符合支付它转发互惠只发生在最初的几个决定，每个参与者和合作起源于固有的亲社会的个人。相比之下，同一组参与者在另一种间接互惠游戏中表现出持续的合作链，在这种游戏中，参与者通过合作获得声誉。我们的实验结果表明，pay-it-forward互惠是短暂的，当一个人反复做出决定时就会消失，而基于声誉的互惠在同样的情况下是稳定的。
Humans often forward kindness received from others to strangers, a phenomenon called the upstream or pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity. Some field observations and laboratory experiments found evidence of pay-it-forward reciprocity in which chains of cooperative acts persist in social dilemma situations. Theoretically, however, cooperation based on pay-it-forward reciprocity is not sustainable. We carried out laboratory experiments of a pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity game (i.e., chained gift-giving game) on a large scale in terms of group size and time. We found that cooperation consistent with pay-it-forward reciprocity occurred only in a first few decisions per participant and that cooperation originated from inherent pro-sociality of individuals. In contrast, the same groups of participants showed persisting chains of cooperation in a different indirect reciprocity game in which participants earned reputation by cooperating. Our experimental results suggest that pay-it-forward reciprocity is transient and disappears when a person makes decisions repeatedly, whereas the reputation-based reciprocity is stable in the same situation.