PHYSICIAN RESPONSE TO FEE CHANGES WITH MULTIPLE PAYERS
PHYSICIAN RESPONSE TO FEE CHANGES WITH MULTIPLE PAYERS
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DOI：
10.1016/0167-6296(91)90022-f
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发表时间：
1991-01-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
PAULY, MV
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
MCGUIRE, TG;PAULY, MV
本文建立了包含利润最大化和目标收入行为两种基准案例的需求诱导下的一般医生行为模型。研究表明，当收入效应不存在时，医生追求利润最大化；当收入效应很强时，医生追求目标收入。该模型用于在利润最大化和目标收入行为的替代行为假设下，推导出医生在一个以上付款人的现实情况下对费用变化的反应的自身和交叉价格表达式。讨论了对公共和私人收费政策的影响，以及医生对收费反应的实证研究。
This paper develops a general model of physician behavior with demand inducement encompassing the two benchmark cases of profit maximization and target-income behavior. It is shown that when income effects are absent, physicians maximize profits, and when income effects are very strong, physicians seek a target income. The model is used to derive own and cross-price expressions for the response of physicians to fee changes in the realistic context of more than one payer under the alternative behavior assumptions of profit maximization and target income behavior. The implications for public and private fee policy, and empirical research on physician response to fees, are discussed.