Detection and Mitigation of Spoofing Attacks Against Time Synchronization and Positioning
Detection and Mitigation of Spoofing Attacks Against Time Synchronization and Positioning
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DOI：
10.1109/access.2023.3341028
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发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Junhwan Lee;Erick Schmidt;Nikolaos Gatsis;D. Akopian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Junhwan Lee;Erick Schmidt;Nikolaos Gatsis;D. Akopian
全球导航卫星系统（GNSS）接收机容易受到蓄意欺骗攻击，这些攻击可以操纵位置，速度和时间（PVT）测量。以前的工作已经证明，时间同步攻击（TSA）可以检测和减轻使用稀疏优化技术，揭示欺骗者的存在，在受影响的信号的衍生域。为了提供一种有效的防欺骗保护算法，本文扩展了稀疏信号处理框架的范围，以解决固定和低动态接收器的更复杂的攻击。特别是，如果位置和速度同时由Spokesman操纵，则应不同地解决针对固定接收器的TSA。提出了一种新的稀疏处理方法，采用了一种新的线性化的测量方程，包括攻击对时间，位置和速度。该方法针对真实的和合成的欺骗信号进行评估，以验证其在两个测试台中的鲁棒性：1）基于实验室的软件定义的GPS接收器;和2）商业手持设备。
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers are vulnerable to intentional spoofing attacks which can manipulate position, velocity, and time (PVT) measurements. Previous work has demonstrated that Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs) can be detected and mitigated using sparse optimization techniques which reveal spoofers’ presence in inflicted signals’ derivative domains. Aiming to provide an efficient protection algorithm against spoofing, this paper expands the scope of the sparse signal processing framework to address more complicated attacks for stationary and low-dynamic receivers. In particular, TSAs against stationary receivers should be addressed differently if the position and velocity are manipulated by the spoofer at the same time. A new sparse processing method is presented employing a novel linearization of the measurement equation that includes attacks against time, position, and velocity. The method is assessed against both authentically and synthetically spoofed signals to verify its robustness in two test beds: 1) a lab-based software defined GPS receiver; and 2) a commercial hand-held device.