The search value of a set
The search value of a set
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集合的搜索值
DOI：
10.1007/s10479-016-2252-y
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
4.8
通讯作者：
David M. Ramsey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Fokkink;K. Kikuta;David M. Ramsey
我们研究搜索游戏，其中隐藏者可能隐藏在有限数量的位置。我们假设搜索这些位置的成本不取决于搜索位置的顺序。从这些假设中，我们得出成本函数是子模的，从而将带有固定隐藏者的搜索游戏置于联盟博弈的背景下。
We study search games in which the hider may hide in a finite number of locations. We assume that the cost of searching these locations does not depend on the order in which the locations are searched. From these assumptions we derive that the cost function is submodular, thus placing search games with an immobile hider in the context of coalitional games.