International Medium of Exchange: Privilege and Duty
International Medium of Exchange: Privilege and Duty
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国际交换媒介：特权与义务
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Rosen Valchev
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Chahrour;Rosen Valchev
美国享有“极高的特权”，允许它以特别低的利率借款。与此同时，世界贸易的美元化似乎保护了美国不受国际动荡的影响。我们提供了一种新的理论，通过需要一种国际交换媒介，将美元化和过度特权联系起来。我们考虑一个两国世界，国际贸易发生在分散的匹配市场，必须以安全资产为抵押--也就是。货币-由两个国家之一发行。交易员有动机协调他们的货币选择，在均衡状态下会出现一种单一的主导货币。由于交易员信息的异质性很小，该模型提供了从经济状况到主要货币的独特映射。然而，该模型提供了一个动态的多样性：在稳定状态下，任何一种货币都可以作为国际交换媒介。货币占主导地位的经济体享有较低的利率，并有能力无限期地维持经常账户赤字。汇率制度是稳定的，但足够大的冲击或政策变化可能会导致转型，带来巨大的福利影响。
The United States enjoys an “exorbitant privilege” that allows it to borrow at especially low interest rates. Meanwhile, the dollarization of world trade appears to shield the U.S. from international disturbances. We provide a new theory that links dollarization and exorbitant privilege through the need for an international medium of exchange. We consider a two-country world where international trade happens in decentralized matching markets, and must be collateralized by safe assets — a.k.a. currencies — issued by one of the two countries. Traders have an incentive to coordinate their currency choices and a single dominant currency arises in equilibrium. With small heterogeneity in traders’ information, the model delivers a unique mapping from economic conditions to the dominant currency. Nevertheless, the model delivers a dynamic multiplicity: in steady-state either currency can serve as the international medium of exchange. The economy with the dominant currency enjoys lower interest rates and the ability to run current account deficits indefinitely. Currency regimes are stable, but sufficiently large shocks or policy changes can lead to transitions, with large welfare implications.