The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Introduce Ideology into Judicial Selection
The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Introduce Ideology into Judicial Selection
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从律师中选择法官的政治：将意识形态引入司法选择的法律职业和党派激励
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发表时间：
2017
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通讯作者：
M. Sen
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作者：
Adam Bonica;M. Sen
使用一个数据集捕捉近50万美国法官和律师的意识形态定位，我们提出的证据表明，意识形态如何影响法官的选择在联邦和州司法机构。我们的文件，更高的法院，它偏离意识形态的律师，这表明意识形态在司法选择中起着很大的作用。我们还表明，意识形态在法官通过政治任命或党派选举选出的司法管辖区中发挥着更大的作用。我们的研究结果表明，意识形态是司法选择的重要组成部分，主要是当使用意识形态导致政治家的预期利益时，当司法管辖区的选择过程允许使用意识形态时，以及当它涉及到最重要的法院时。这项研究是第一个提供了一个直接的意识形态比较，在司法阶层和法官和律师之间，并解释如何以及为什么美国法院变得政治化。
Using a data set capturing the ideological positioning of nearly half a million US judges and lawyers, we present evidence showing how ideology affects the selection of judges across federal and state judiciaries. We document that the higher the court, the more it deviates ideologically from the ideology of attorneys, which suggests that ideology plays a strong role in judicial selection. We also show that ideology plays stronger roles in jurisdictions where judges are selected via political appointments or partisan elections. Our findings suggest that ideology is an important component of judicial selection primarily when using ideology leads to expected benefits to politicians, when the jurisdiction’s selection process allows ideology to be used, and when it concerns the most important courts. This study is the first to provide a direct ideological comparison across judicial tiers and between judges and lawyers and to explain how and why American courts become politicized.